ROV breakdown and equipment-failure review
A conservative minimum of 70:54:47 ROV-system downtime
Seventeen defensible root-cause incidents were identified across HD84 vehicle, launch/recovery, navigation and ROV-mounted survey or inspection systems.
Executive reading
What drove the result
Dominant class
Payload and survey systems account for 62.4%
CP, TSS, laser, camera and MBES interruptions totalled 44:14:28, substantially more than strict core vehicle or electrical downtime.
Largest campaign
24:14:33
CP communications, digitiser, MUX, Mini IPS and ground-fault troubleshooting across 30–31 July.
Recovery exposure
13 of 17
Incidents involved deck recovery, TMS return, recovery instruction or multiple recovery cycles.
Open at log end
MBES remained unresolved
Only three explicit stopped intervals on 5 August are counted. The reported total is therefore a minimum, not an upper bound.
System contribution
Where the 70:54:47 sits
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Downtime by primary class
Measured operational unavailability
Chronology
Failures clustered late in the campaign
The bars show elapsed incident windows across 12 July–5 August. Very short interruptions are widened for visibility.
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Audited ledger
Seventeen grouped root-cause incidents
Select any incident for the full duration basis, recovery treatment, source rows and caveat.
No ledger entries found
The current filters exclude every incident.
Audit boundaries
What was deliberately kept outside the KPI
Exclusion prevents weather, planned activity, inspection IT and unconfirmed constraints being misrepresented as ROV breakdown.
Methodology
Built for traceability, not false precision
The source is an online operational log, not a dedicated downtime register. Each interval therefore follows the chronology of explicit failures, stops, recoveries, troubleshooting, repairs, redeployments and resumptions.
Conservative minimum: the final MBES issue had no confirmed resolution by source row 1909. Unmeasured continuation is not added.
- 01
Read the complete operational record
All 1,906 rows in Survey-HD84 were assessed with supporting settings and connection sheets.
- 02
Identify defensible markers
Failure, stop, recovery, deck or TMS state, troubleshooting, repair and production-resumption wording was linked chronologically.
- 03
Group repeated root causes
Repeated entries from the same campaign were grouped into one incident to prevent double counting.
- 04
Measure operational unavailability
Intervals run from the first defensible stop to resolution, redeployment or production resumption.
- 05
Separate non-breakdown causes
Commissioning, inspection IT, survey software, weather, planned calibration and unconfirmed constraints remain outside the KPI.
- 06
Expose uncertainty
Mixed causation, corrected timestamps, approximate endpoints and open incidents are shown rather than silently normalised.